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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This case is the last in a long line of cases in which the 
parties and the district courts have had to divine whether, 
notwithstanding the jury’s guilty verdict, there was sufficient 
evidence—and whether we would conclude there was 
sufficient evidence—for the jury to have determined that the 
defendant knew that the object of the conspiracy in which he 
participated was a controlled substance, as opposed to some 
other type of contraband.  We say that this case is “the last” 
because, after considerable thought, we have concluded that, 
in many of these opinions, we failed to apply the deferential 
standard the law requires on review of sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges.  In those cases, we employed what we 
have called a “strict approach”—which has been criticized by 
other judges and commentators
1—and in doing so, failed to 
apply the proper deferential standard that we routinely apply 
in reviewing other criminal cases when a defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. 
                                              
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630, 641 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (Katz, J., dissenting); Diana Eisner Lipschutz, 
Comment, “Are You Telling Me Those Computer Chips Were 
Really Heroin?”: A Look at the Third Circuit’s Scope of 
Appellate Review for Accomplice Liability in Controlled 
Substances Crimes, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 497, 519 (2009). 
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A jury concluded that Defendant Richard Caraballo-
Rodriguez knew that he was transporting a controlled 
substance when he participated in a conspiracy to transport 
approximately five million dollars’ worth of cocaine from 
San Juan, Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
2
  
Relying on the reasoning of our previous opinions in 
considering Caraballo-Rodriguez’s post-trial motion for 
acquittal, the District Court disagreed with the jury’s verdict 
because “the evidence only shows that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
knew that he was being entrusted with a large suitcase which 
could contain [] a ‘wide variety of contraband items . . . 
including stolen jewelry, laundered money, stolen computer 
chips, and counterfeiting plates.’”  (Supp. App. 44 (quoting 
United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 1998)).)  
The District Court therefore granted Caraballo-Rodriguez’s 
motion and entered a judgment of acquittal. 
 
After hearing oral argument in this case, we voted to 
rehear the case en banc to address “our circuit’s seemingly 
                                              
2
 In this case, the government requested that the jury be 
instructed on willful blindness, which the District Court 
granted.  Thus, the government could satisfy the “knowledge” 
requirement by demonstrating actual knowledge or willful 
blindness, which is “a subjective state of mind that is deemed 
to satisfy a scienter requirement of knowledge.”  United 
States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Willful blindness, however, “is not to be equated with 
negligence or lack of due care. . . .  [Rather,] the defendant 
himself [must have been] subjectively aware of the high 
probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a 
reasonable man would have been aware of the probability.”  
Id; see also note 7, infra. 
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paradoxical standard of review” on sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges in drug conspiracy cases.  United States 
v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 488 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010) (Fisher, J., 
concurring).  We did so to decide whether our review in this 
discrete area should follow form with the “strict approach” 
established by our precedent, or whether we will reestablish a 
familiar course with respect to sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges in other situations.  We have decided to do the 
latter, returning to the deferential review standard we 
normally apply.   
 
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
I. 
On May 1, 2008, Appellee Richard Caraballo-
Rodriguez and one of his co-defendants, Luis Deya-Diaz, 
triggered the suspicion of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) when they purchased last-minute 
one-way airplane tickets from San Juan, Puerto Rico to 
Philadelphia International Airport in cash, checked no 
luggage, and held no carry-on baggage.
3
  As a result, DEA 
agents in Philadelphia organized a surveillance team at the 
airport.     
 
Despite not having checked any baggage, both Deya-
Diaz and Caraballo-Rodriguez proceeded to the baggage 
claim after deplaning.  Another co-defendant, Juan Cordero, 
                                              
3
 Deya-Diaz testified that he “had like an overnight bag with 
[him].”  (Supp. App. 322.) 
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met the two men at the baggage claim.  Deya-Diaz retrieved 
two suitcases bearing distinctive markings from the baggage 
carousel and followed Cordero out of the terminal and into a 
parking garage.  Caraballo-Rodriguez stayed in the baggage 
claim area by himself, collected two additional suitcases with 
distinctive markings, and then walked with the suitcases to 
the parking garage.   
 
 In the parking garage, two vehicles were parked near 
each other—a Suburban and a minivan.  Deya-Diaz and 
Caraballo-Rodriguez were each responsible for delivering the 
suitcases to the Suburban and were then directed by Cordero 
to get in the minivan.  DEA agents then observed the two 
vehicles leave the parking garage, going opposite directions 
on Interstate 95.  A man named Wilfredo Aquino drove the 
Suburban northbound, and Cordero drove the minivan 
southbound with Deya-Diaz and Caraballo-Rodriguez as 
passengers.   
 
 Aquino was pulled over in the Suburban shortly after 
leaving the airport.  The state trooper who pulled him over 
obtained consent to search the vehicle and found the four 
suitcases in the back.  According to the trooper, the bags were 
quite heavy.
4
  He then broke the locks on the suitcases and 
saw bricks of cocaine packed in the suitcases.  A search 
warrant subsequently confirmed that two of the suitcases had 
                                              
4
 Specifically, the state trooper testified: “I can’t remember 
exactly now whether I pushed them, or drug them, or tried to 
move them, and it was like they didn’t move, I mean it was 
heavy.  I’m like well, that’s not clothes, that’s for sure, there’s 
no way.”  (Supp. App.  125.)   
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twelve kilograms each of cocaine, and the other two suitcases 
had thirteen kilograms of cocaine each.  In total, there were 
nearly fifty kilograms of cocaine between the four bags.
5
  An 
expert testified that the shipment had a retail value of 
approximately $5 million.   
 
 Meanwhile, the minivan driven by Cordero was 
stopped by state troopers on I-95 South after a state trooper 
observed the minivan swerve between lanes and take evasive 
actions.  Cordero, Deya-Diaz, and Caraballo-Rodriguez were 
all taken into custody.  The agents recovered cell phones from 
the men upon arrest—Cordero’s phone was missing the chip 
that stores information and call history because Cordero had 
thrown the chip out of the driver-side window before being 
pulled over.  Deya-Diaz was carrying $456 in cash, 
Caraballo-Rodriguez had $33 in cash, and Cordero had 
$1,173 in cash.  At the police barracks, only Deya-Diaz gave 
a statement—he provided a story about his reasons for 
traveling to Philadelphia, claiming that he was going to 
Cordero’s house in either New Jersey or New York, and that 
he had no idea that Caraballo-Rodriguez was also meeting 
Cordero at the airport.   
 
 A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
returned an indictment charging Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
Cordero, and Deya-Diaz with conspiring to distribute cocaine, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession of cocaine with 
the intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting possession 
                                              
5
 The parties stipulated that a laboratory test found that the 
total quantity of all the cocaine was 49.1 kilograms, with a 
cocaine purity of 76%. 
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with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Deya-Diaz subsequently 
entered a guilty plea and testified against Caraballo-
Rodriguez and Cordero, who both proceeded to trial and were 
tried jointly.
6
 
 
While on the stand, Deya-Diaz recanted the story he 
gave at the police barracks and testified that he had 
previously acted as a courier, shuttling cash between Puerto 
Rico and New York.  Before September 11, 2001, Deya-Diaz 
would travel with large amounts of cash strapped to his body; 
after September 11, he transported suitcases with cash from 
North America to Puerto Rico.  Although Deya-Diaz had 
transported cash on several prior occasions, he testified that 
he had not knowingly transported drugs before.  According to 
Deya-Diaz, in April 2008, an unidentified Dominican male 
known to Deya-Diaz as “Domi” called him and offered him 
$5,000 to fly to from Puerto Rico to Philadelphia and pick up 
two suitcases at the Philadelphia airport.  Domi told Deya-
Diaz that someone would recognize him at the airport and 
take him to the parking garage, where Deya-Diaz would turn 
over the suitcases.  The trip was originally planned for April 
25, 2008.  Before the flight, Deya-Diaz met Domi in Puerto 
Rico, and Domi repaid Deya-Diaz for the plane tickets, 
showed him the suitcases he was to retrieve in Philadelphia, 
asked Deya-Diaz to describe what he would wear at the 
airport, and told Deya-Diaz that he would be paid $5,000 
when he arrived in New York, after being driven from the 
Philadelphia airport. Domi subsequently called Deya-Diaz 
                                              
6
 After a magistrate judge found that there was not probable 
cause to support the arrest of Aquino, the prosecution did not 
charge Aquino in the indictment. 
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and told him that the trip was rescheduled for May 1. Deya-
Diaz testified that no one told him that there were drugs in the 
suitcases, and that he did not know that any other courier 
would be on the flight.   
 
Deya-Diaz further testified that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
was not there when Deya-Diaz put his suitcases in the 
Suburban, but that Caraballo-Rodriguez entered the van after 
he was already seated.  During the ride, Deya-Diaz asked 
Cordero when he would be paid, but Deya-Diaz did not 
remember Caraballo-Rodriguez saying anything.  Deya-Diaz 
testified that he, Cordero, and Caraballo-Rodriguez were 
brought to the police barracks and while there, the three of 
them discussed concocting a story to explain why they were 
in Philadelphia.   
 
 When Deya-Diaz was questioned about his knowledge 
of the contents of the suitcases, he initially said “I didn’t 
know it was drugs.  I knew that it was something bad that was 
happening, because nobody is going to pay five thousand 
dollars for picking up the suitcases.”  (Supp. App. 308.)  The 
questioning continued: 
 
Q: Now, going back to May 1st of 2008, did 
anyone tell you what was going to be in the 
suitcases on that occasion? 
 
A: No. 
 
Q: And what did you understand would be in the 
suitcases? 
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A:  My common sense tells me that paying five 
thousand dollars just to come to Philadelphia to 
pick up two suitcases at the airport, it wasn’t for 
clothing. 
 
Q: And did you – 
 
A: I always guessed that it was something illegal. 
 
Q: And did you come to realize it was drugs? 
 
A: When the suitcases came down from the 
conveyor and I picked up both suitcases, I 
noticed that for their size they were very heavy. 
 
(Id. at 312.)  On cross-examination, Deya-Diaz said that when 
he picked the suitcases up, he knew they contained 
“something forbidden,” and “guessed” that it was drugs.  (Id. 
at 429.)  He added, “[c]ommon sense, drugs.  Who else would 
take five thousand dollars to pick up a suitcase full of 
clothes?”  (Id. at 435.) 
 
The government introduced phone records indicating 
that Deya-Diaz had received calls from, and placed calls to, 
the same phone number several times between April 25 and 
May 1.  Deya-Diaz testified that this number belonged to 
Domi.  Caraballo-Rodriguez’s phone records indicated that he 
had had similar contact with the same phone number 
throughout the same time period, although there was no 
evidence as to the substance of those calls.  Before the May 1 
flight, both Deya-Diaz’s phone and Caraballo-Rodriguez’s 
phone contacted that number as well.   
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  The government also presented expert testimony of a 
state narcotics agent, Alan Basewitz.  Agent Basewitz 
testified that this case involved several indicia of organized 
drug trafficking:  
 
If they have no checked bags, it’s a cash one 
way ticket, it’s coming from San Juan, and there 
is no carry on baggage from a passenger, those 
characteristics in combination are something 
that I would, if I could, go lights and siren to the 
airport to observe, not to arrest, to see if 
anybody is going to be claiming baggage. 
 
(Id. at 615-16.)  Agent Basewitz also described the typical 
characteristics of couriers: 
 
They are trusted individuals.  The couriers, if 
you’re transporting a significant amount, their 
addresses or families and information are 
known to the person who is either coordinating 
or supplying.  The inverse is not true, in most 
instances.  And they have to be trusted because 
of the amounts that they ferry back and forth, 
both if it’s cash, depending on which direction 
you’re heading, or if it’s drugs. 
 
They are, sometimes, trained what to say to 
police, if they’re told to ignore them or come up 
with a concoction of a story.  It is a very risky 
thing.  Sometimes they are not told the exact 
type of drug.  Quite often during my proffers 
and interviews and intelligence information 
through conversations with informants and 
12 
 
cooperators and other law enforcement and 
most through my personal interactions with 
these individuals, they know it’s drugs.  They 
may not know the type, depending on the 
group.  They may not know the weight.  But, 
they know or should have known that it’s drugs. 
 
(Id. at 622-23.)
7
  
After a five-day trial, in which the government 
presented the evidence discussed above, the jury was 
instructed and given its charge.  The District Court gave a 
willful blindness instruction at the government’s request.8  On 
                                              
7
 Agent Basewitz distinguished the present situation from a 
“blind mule” situation, such as when a person is asked to 
carry a bag for a person known to him or when a baggage 
handler switches baggage tags and a person’s tag is placed on 
another suitcase containing drugs.  (Supp. App. 624-26.)   
 
8
 The District Court’s willful blindness instruction stated, in 
pertinent part:  
 
In this case, there is a question whether . . . 
Richard Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that the 
luggage in question contained cocaine.  When, 
as in this case, knowledge of a particular fact or 
circumstance is an essential part of the offense 
charged, the government may prove that . . . 
Caraballo-Rodriguez deliberately closed his 
eyes to what would otherwise have been 
obvious to him. 
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July 6, 2009, the jury returned a verdict convicting both 
Caraballo-Rodriguez and Cordero of conspiracy to distribute 
                                                                                                     
No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by 
deliberately ignoring what is obvious.  Thus, 
you may find that . . . Caraballo-Rodriguez 
knew that the luggage in question contained 
cocaine based on evidence which proves that: 
(1) . . . Caraballo-Rodriguez consciously and 
deliberately tried to avoid learning about this 
circumstance. 
 
You may not find that . . . Caraballo-Rodriguez 
knew that the luggage in question contained 
cocaine if you find that the defendant actually 
believed that this circumstance did not exist.  
Also, you may not find that . . . Caraballo-
Rodriguez knew that the luggage in question 
contained cocaine if you find only that . . . 
Caraballo-Rodriguez should have known of the 
circumstance or that a reasonable person would 
have known of a high probability of the 
circumstance.  It is not enough that . . . 
Caraballo-Rodriguez may have been stupid or 
foolish, or may have acted out of inadvertence 
or accident.  You must find that . . . Caraballo-
Rodriguez [was] actually aware of a high 
probability of the fact that the luggage in 
question contained cocaine, deliberately 
avoided learning about it, and did not actually 
believe that it did not exist. 
 
(Supp. App. 32 n.134.)   
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and possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms 
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession of 
more than five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).   
 
Thereafter, Caraballo-Rodriguez and Cordero filed a 
joint post-trial motion for acquittal, which the District Court 
granted as to Caraballo-Rodriguez on September 7, 2011.  
Looking to our precedent, the District Court concluded that 
the government’s evidence was not sufficient to support an 
inference that Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that the object of 
the conspiracy was drugs.  The District Court observed that: 
(1) Deya-Diaz’s testimony did not include “statements . . . 
made to or about” Caraballo-Rodriguez, and therefore Deya-
Diaz’s testimony did not “alter the calculus of evidence”; (2) 
the government did not present any evidence of the substance 
of the phone calls placed and received by Caraballo-
Rodriguez; (3) there was no evidence of a prior relationship 
between the men; and (4) there was no evidence that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez had acted as a courier before.  (Supp. 
App. 32-39.)  In considering Agent Basewitz’s testimony, the 
District Court surmised that “[i]f the jury accepted Basewitz’s 
testimony, it may have . . . infer[red] that because Caraballo-
Rodriguez was a courier, he knew the object of the conspiracy 
was to smuggle drugs.”  (Id. at 39.)  Despite the fact that the 
jury heard Agent Basewitz’s testimony and Caraballo-
Rodriguez did not object to it, the District Court nonetheless 
concluded that “in the absence of any other evidence from 
which the jury could permissibly draw an inference of 
knowledge, the court will not permit an expert’s conclusory 
statements about the defendant’s mental state to tip the 
15 
 
balance.”  (Id. at 44.)  Accordingly, the District Court entered 
a judgment of acquittal as to Caraballo-Rodriguez.
9
 
 
The government’s timely appeal followed. 
II.   
 We exercise plenary review over an appeal from the 
grant of a judgment of acquittal, and independently apply the 
same standard the district court uses in deciding the motion.  
See Boria, 592 F.3d at 480. 
 
Today we consider that standard.  The way courts—
our Court and district courts—review challenges leveled at 
the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal trials is a fairly 
basic topic upon which many courts have expounded.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 
(1979), “the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. at 318-19 (emphasis in original).  While we have set forth 
the standard many times since Jackson, today we grapple 
with how to faithfully adhere to it.  
 
 
                                              
9
 As to Cordero, the District Court held that “[a]lthough this 
is admittedly a close case, we conclude that the Government’s 
evidence against Cordero was sufficient to support the jury’s 
verdict.”  (Supp. App. 49.)  We address Cordero’s appeal in a 
separate opinion. 
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III.   
Notwithstanding careful recitations of the appropriate 
standard to apply when ruling on sufficiency of the evidence 
claims, we have applied that standard in a more searching 
manner when the issue involves knowledge of a controlled 
substance.  As noted below, this has produced inconsistent 
results in drug conspiracy cases.  In the present appeal, the 
government urges that, sitting en banc, we should abandon 
our case law that dissects the evidence presented at trial.  It 
insists that the jury’s verdict in this case is justified under an 
ordinary sufficiency of the evidence standard of review.  
Caraballo-Rodriguez, on the other hand, argues that this case 
falls squarely within our line of precedent in which we have 
held that the government failed to present “specific evidence” 
of the defendant’s knowledge of the transaction’s subject 
matter.  
A. 
To prove a conspiracy, the government must show: (1) 
a shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common 
illegal goal; and (3) an agreement to work toward that goal.  
Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 
172 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The government must 
establish each element beyond a reasonable doubt.  United 
States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir. 1987).  It may 
do so with direct or circumstantial evidence.  United States v. 
Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).  Circumstantial 
inferences drawn from the evidence must bear a “logical or 
convincing connection to established fact.”  United States v. 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2004).   
When considering drug conspiracy cases over the past 
several decades, we have viewed the second element—
17 
 
“illegal goal”—as requiring proof that the defendant had 
knowledge of the specific objective contemplated by the 
particular conspiracy.  Id. at 287.  As mentioned above, 
“knowledge” can be demonstrated by actual knowledge or 
willful blindness.  See Brodie, 403 F.3d at 148 (“The 
knowledge element . . . may be satisfied upon a showing 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had actual 
knowledge or deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise 
would have been obvious to him concerning the fact in 
question.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Pursuant to 
that requirement, we have examined the record in each case to 
determine whether the government put forth “drug-related 
evidence, considered with the surrounding circumstances, 
from which a rational trier of fact could logically infer that 
the defendant knew a controlled substance was involved in 
the transaction at issue.”  Boria, 592 F.3d at 481.  While “we 
have explicitly recognized that the government may 
circumstantially establish the element of knowledge ‘grain-
by-grain until the scale finally tips,’” United States v. 
Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992)), in many 
cases we have nonetheless meticulously scrutinized the nature 
and quality of the evidence, essentially reweighing it.  As a 
result, we have reached inconsistent conclusions regarding 
the “knowledge” prong in our sufficiency of the evidence test 
in drug conspiracy cases.   
 
The trend that we revisit today began in United States 
v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988).  Looking back at 
Wexler recently in Claxton, we characterized the path we had 
taken: “we have arguably asked more of prosecutors than our 
statements regarding the adequacy of circumstantial evidence 
express, requiring some additional piece of evidence imputing 
18 
 
knowledge of drugs to the defendant even in the presence of 
otherwise suspicious circumstances.”  Claxton, 685 F.3d at 
306 (internal quotation marks, alteration omitted).  In Wexler 
and several subsequent cases, we found that the government 
had not offered specific evidence from which a jury could 
infer that the defendant knew that a controlled substance—as 
opposed to some other contraband—was the object of the 
conspiracy.  That failure, we held, was fatal and required 
acquittal. 
 
In Wexler, we concluded that the evidence, which 
suggested that the defendant served as a lookout in a 
conspiracy to transport hashish, was not sufficient for the jury 
to find that the defendant knew that drugs were the object of 
the conspiracy.  838 F.2d at 91-92.  The defendant had 
engaged in surveillance during the course of the drug 
delivery, signaled to the driver of the truck containing the 
hashish, talked to one of the drivers of the truck on two 
separate occasions, and upon his arrest had a portable CB 
radio he had purchased the day before under a false name.  Id. 
at 89-90.  We nonetheless found that the record was “missing 
‘the totality of evidence from which a reasonable juror could 
logically infer’ that [the defendant] had knowledge of the 
object of the conspiracy.”  Id. at 92 (quoting Coleman, 811 
F.2d at 808).  Although we noted that there was “ample 
circumstantial evidence . . . from which the jury could have 
concluded that [the defendant] was involved in a conspiracy . 
. . and that the conspiracy involved movement of the cargo of 
the truck,” we concluded that there was no evidence that the 
defendant knew that a controlled substance was the cargo in 
the truck.  Id. at 91.  Notwithstanding the fact that the jury 
had inferred that the defendant knew of the object of the 
conspiracy, we noted that “[t]he evidence [was] just as 
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consistent, for example, with a conspiracy to transport stolen 
goods, an entirely different crime.”  Id. at 92. 
 
Citing Wexler, we concluded similarly in United States 
v. Salmon that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to 
find that the defendant knew that drugs were involved in the 
transaction at issue and reversed the conviction.  944 F.2d 
1106 (3d Cir. 1991).  There, the defendant had also performed 
surveillance, spoken to co-conspirators, and possessed 
surveillance equipment when he was arrested.  Id. at 1114.  
Additionally, the defendant opened a car’s trunk, and an 
alleged co-conspirator approached the trunk and appeared to 
retrieve a package of cocaine.  Id.  We rejected the 
government’s argument that the defendant’s movements in 
the parking lot combined with the consistency and wrapping 
of the cocaine in a brown paper bag could allow a reasonable 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knew that cocaine or another controlled substance was the 
object of the transaction.  Id.  We noted that the government 
had not established that the package was ever in the trunk, 
and that there was no evidence that the defendant knew what 
the package contained.  Id. at 1114-15. 
 
We also reversed the jury’s verdict against the 
defendant in United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 
1997).  There, the defendant’s co-conspirator, who was 
cooperating with law enforcement, left a suitcase from which 
drugs had previously been seized in a hotel room, and left a 
key to the room at the front desk.  Id. at 405.  The defendant, 
who was offered $500 by a stranger to enter the hotel room, 
confirm the presence of the suitcase, and leave the door open, 
was arrested after he exited the room.  Id. at 404-05.  There 
was no evidence of a prior relationship between the defendant 
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and the co-conspirators, no evidence that the defendant had 
actually spoken to the co-conspirators, no evidence of the 
substance of suspicious phone calls placed and received by 
the defendant, and no evidence that the defendant had even 
picked up the suitcase.  Id. at 405-06.  Citing Wexler, we 
concluded that although the defendant “knew that he was 
somehow involved in an illicit activity,” under our case law 
“there [was] no evidence from which a jury could permissibly 
infer that [the defendant] knew that the object of the 
conspiracy was to possess cocaine with the intent to 
distribute.”  Id. at 405, 406. 
 
We next addressed the sufficiency of the evidence in a 
drug conspiracy case in United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d at 
266.  In that case, the defendant’s co-conspirator negotiated to 
buy two kilograms of heroin from a DEA informant.  Id. at 
267.  During the transaction, the defendant was introduced to 
the DEA informant as the driver.  Id.  The defendant removed 
a bag of cash from the trunk of the car, assured the informant 
that the money was all there, and removed personal 
documents from the bag before handing it to the informant.  
Id.  The defendant also removed a suitcase from the 
informant’s car, placed it in his own car, opened the suitcase, 
noticed that it was empty, and told his co-conspirator that 
“[t]hey didn’t pack this thing.”  Id. at 267-68.  The informant 
attempted to reassure the defendant and his co-conspirator 
that something was concealed in the frame of the suitcase.  Id. 
at 268.   
 
The jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute heroin.  Id. at 266.  We 
reversed, finding a “lack of specific evidence of [his] 
knowledge of the transaction’s subject matter.”  Id. at 270.  
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Although it was “crystal clear that [the defendant] was—and 
knew that he was—involved in an illicit transaction of some 
sort,” a divided panel concluded that there was not “sufficient 
evidence that [he] knew that the subject matter of the 
transaction was a controlled substance, rather than some other 
form of contraband, such as stolen jewels or computer chips 
or currency.”  Id. at 266.  
 
In dissent, Judge Stapleton urged that the evidence 
supported the jury’s guilty verdict, noting that the jury could 
have drawn permissible inferences from the facts: namely that 
there was significant risk in the transaction, the defendant was 
a “trusted confidant,” and the defendant had sole custody of 
the cash at times.  Id. at 271 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).  
Furthermore, he observed that the defendant was assigned to 
check the bag to make sure it contained what his co-
conspirator had negotiated for, from which the jury could 
have easily inferred that the defendant knew his co-
conspirator was not paying for stolen jewels, computer chips, 
or currency.  Id.  Under a “common sense approach to the 
evidence,” Judge Stapleton concluded that “the jury properly 
could conclude that [the defendant] was guilty as charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.   
 
More recently, in United States v. Cartwright, 359 
F.3d 281, we again concluded that the government had fallen 
short of adducing evidence of the defendant’s knowledge that 
the conspiracy involved drugs.  In that case, the defendant 
served as a lookout during a drug transaction.  Id. at 286.  
After the drug supplier retrieved drugs from his car—which 
was in an area where there was no law enforcement 
surveillance—he returned accompanied by the defendant.  Id. 
at 284.  The government argued that the jury properly inferred 
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the defendant’s knowledge because: (1) the defendant first 
appeared at the same time that the drug supplier was observed 
carrying a bag of cocaine; (2) the defendant walked side-by-
side with the drug supplier, and the two were observed talking 
with each other; (3) the defendant possessed a loaded semi-
automatic firearm, a cellular phone, $180 in cash, and a two-
way text messaging device upon his arrest; and (4) the 
defendant did not possess keys to a vehicle of his own.  Id. at 
288.  Noting that “where an inference as to a defendant’s 
knowledge is based upon speculation, our case law forbids us 
from upholding his conviction,” we concluded that the jury’s 
inference that the defendant knew of the subject matter of the 
transaction was impermissible because it was based solely on 
speculation.  Id. (citing Thomas, 114 F.3d at 406).  
Accordingly, we reversed the judgment against the defendant. 
 
We have subsequently viewed this line of cases as 
requiring “some additional piece of evidence imputing 
knowledge of drugs to the defendant.”  Boria, 592 F.3d at 
482.  There has been confusion, however, as to what sort of 
evidence must be offered to demonstrate “knowledge.”  As 
Judge Fisher noted in his concurring opinion in Boria, “[i]t 
may be that the difficulty of producing evidence that the 
defendant knew that the subject matter was a controlled 
substance has turned our standard of review, not in name but 
in application, into a requirement for direct evidence.”  Id. at 
488 n.12 (Fisher, J., concurring); see also Claxton, 685 F.3d 
at 305-06 (“In drug conspiracy cases . . . we have arguably 
asked more of prosecutors than our statements regarding the 
adequacy of circumstantial evidence express . . . .”).  
 
To add to the confusion, we have been inconsistent in 
conducting our review of this knowledge element in drug 
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conspiracy cases.  In another line of cases, addressing factual 
situations not that different from the cases discussed above, 
we purported to apply “our strict approach to sufficiency in 
drug conspiracy cases,” but affirmed the jury’s verdict 
because it drew what we viewed as a proper inference of 
knowledge.  Claxton, 685 F.3d at 307 (quoting Boria, 592 
F.3d at 481 n.9).        
 
For example, in United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 
93, we held that the government’s evidence was sufficient to 
show that the defendant knew that he was participating in a 
criminal enterprise involving drugs, and we reversed the 
district court’s grant of defendant’s motion for acquittal.  In 
Iafelice, the defendant drove a car to a drug transaction, 
engaged in counter-surveillance before the drug deal, opened 
the trunk, which contained the package of drugs, and took a 
phone call during the course of the drug deal from his co-
conspirator who had negotiated the drug sale with an 
undercover DEA agent.  Id. at 94.  In upholding the jury’s 
verdict—and reversing the district court—we observed the 
suspicious circumstances, and noted that “[t]he crucial 
additional fact that the drugs were transported in a car owned 
and operated by [the defendant] (coupled with the other 
evidence . . . ) provide[d] the essential additional evidence 
necessary to distinguish this case from the more limited facts 
of Wexler and Salmon.”  Id. at 97.  As we noted, “[c]ommon 
sense counsels that an owner and operator of a vehicle . . . 
usually knows what is in that vehicle.”  Id.   
 
Then, in United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270 (3d 
Cir. 2008), we concluded that a co-conspirator’s testimony 
could provide additional evidence to allow a rational juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew 
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the purpose of a drug conspiracy.  Id. at 279.  In that case, 
two brothers—Juan and Jorge Reyeros—negotiated with 
several individuals to import cocaine into the United States.  
Id. at 275-77.  At trial, a co-conspirator testified that Juan told 
the other members of the conspiracy that Jorge, a customs 
inspector, would facilitate the importation, but the shipment 
would have to be large enough to make it worth the risk to 
Jorge’s career.  Id. at 276.  After the jury returned a guilty 
verdict and the district court denied the brothers’ motions for 
acquittal, we concluded that the co-conspirator’s testimony 
would permit a rational juror to conclude that Jorge knew the 
purpose of the conspiracy.  Id. at 279.  We also noted that 
“[o]ther evidence supports that conclusion as well,” such as 
the fact that “a jury could reasonably infer that Jorge would 
ask his own brother, Juan, the nature of the contraband for 
which he was putting his Customs career at risk,” as well as 
the fact that Jorge was to receive a percentage of the imported 
cocaine’s value, which suggested that he would want to know 
the nature of the contraband.  Id. at 279 n.12. 
 
Following a drug conspiracy conviction in United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d at 480, the district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for acquittal.  On appeal, however, we 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a rational 
jury to conclude that the defendant, who drove a tractor-
trailer that contained cocaine hidden among boxes of rotten 
fruit, knew “something criminal was afoot.”  Id. at 486.  
Although that, by itself, was not sufficient to sustain a 
conspiracy verdict, we held that a co-conspirator’s testimony 
describing the defendant’s role in the conspiracy sufficed to 
enable a rational jury to find that the defendant had 
knowledge that he was participating in a conspiracy involving 
drugs.  Id.  We reversed the district court’s ruling, explaining 
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that the suspicious circumstances and the “truly 
distinguishing fact” that the co-conspirator testified that the 
defendant was responsible for unloading drugs from the truck 
and “tak[ing] the driver of the tractor-trailer to finish off what 
needs to be done inside the truck . . . impute[d] to [the 
defendant] knowledge that the tractor-trailer he was assigned 
to direct to a garage contained drugs, which is the additional 
fact necessary to support the jury’s guilty verdict.”  Id. at 485.  
As previously mentioned, Judge Fisher concurred separately 
to note “the tension between this opinion and some of our 
most recent case law.”  Id. at 486 (Fisher, J., concurring).   
 
Most recently, in United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d at 
301, we held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the 
defendant knew that the object of the conspiracy was drugs, 
reversing the district court and upholding the jury’s guilty 
verdict.  The government presented evidence that the 
defendant was a member of a group of individuals who 
routinely brought cocaine from Colombia into Venezuela, and 
then flew the cocaine to the Virgin Islands so that it could be 
smuggled into the continental United States.  Id. at 302.  
Although there was no evidence that the defendant handled 
drugs himself, a co-conspirator testified that the defendant 
“retriev[ed] the girls out of the airport in St. Thomas, [took] 
them to [another co-conspirator], check[ed] them into [a] 
hotel[,] and [paid] them.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Consistent with this testimony, the “girls”—women 
hired to transport the drug sales’ cash proceeds from North 
Carolina to the Virgin Islands—testified as to their encounters 
with the defendant.  Id. at 302-04.  Furthermore, another co-
conspirator repeatedly identified the defendant as a member 
of the organization, and testified that he had met with the 
defendant several times at a property where the organization’s 
26 
 
cocaine was stored and where members of the organization 
talked about drug activities.  Id. at 304.   
 
A divided panel concluded that “the evidence, as a 
whole, permits . . . a finding [of knowledge of the 
conspiratorial object] because [the defendant] was expressly 
identified as a member of the conspiracy, repeatedly took 
actions to further its ends, and had a close and repeated 
association with its members and facilities.”  Id. at 309.  We 
held that although the co-conspirator testimony in this case 
was different from that offered in Boria, the jury reasonably 
inferred that the defendant knew the object of the conspiracy 
given the totality of the evidence.  Id. at 312.  Although a jury 
could have concluded that the defendant simply kept bad 
company, we determined that we were bound by the jury’s 
determination that the defendant knew what he was involved 
in, as long as it was not irrational.  Id.
10
 
 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Cowen attempted to 
reconcile our precedent regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence in drug conspiracy cases.  He observed that “an 
examination of our precedent” suggested that “an inference of 
knowledge can be drawn from the . . . identification as a 
‘member of the organization,’ only when dominion and 
control over the contraband is inherent to the role that the 
defendant agreed to perform.”  Id. at 314 (Cowen, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Cowen also believed that the majority’s 
reliance on the “totality of the circumstances” was 
                                              
10
 We see the majority opinion in Claxton as perhaps 
presaging today’s ruling, as the majority there grappled with 
the quantum of evidence and concluded that, given the 
totality of the circumstances, the jury verdict should stand. 
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inconsistent with our precedent because the “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis in our prior cases “relied on a 
specific piece of additional evidence to support an inference 
of knowledge of the conspiracy’s object.”  Id. at 318.  He 
further opined that acquittal was required because the 
evidence “equally support[ed] the inference drawn by the 
majority—[the defendant’s] knowledge of drugs—and an 
inference that [he] had knowledge that the conspiracy’s object 
was weapons or some other contraband.”  Id. at 315.  Thus, 
because the “additional” evidence required by our case law 
was lacking, he concluded that the verdict should not stand.  
Id. at 318. 
 
B. 
In looking back at these cases, our analysis has too 
often been more akin to ad hoc second-guessing the juries’ 
verdicts than exercising a review function based on 
sufficiency of the evidence.   
 
We have set forth the appropriate standard in a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge many times.  We 
“review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Under this particularly deferential standard, we 
“must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by 
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.”  Id.  
Furthermore, “we review the evidence as a whole, not in 
isolation, and ask whether it is strong enough for a rational 
trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Boria, 
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592 F.3d at 480.  We must sustain the jury’s verdict “if there 
is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, to uphold the jury’s decision.”  United States 
v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
 
However, in this particular area—drug conspiracy 
cases—it appears that we have examined sufficiency by 
looking at the evidence under a microscope.  In all other 
areas, our review for sufficiency is, as noted above, highly 
deferential, and we will overturn a verdict only “if no 
reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to 
support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807 (quoting 
United States v. Campbell, 702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)); see also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (upholding the jury verdict in a public corruption 
case and noting that “‘[t]here is no requirement . . . that the 
inference drawn by the jury be the only inference possible or 
that the government’s evidence foreclose every possible 
innocent explanation’” (quoting Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97 n.3)); 
Brodie, 403 F.3d at 126 (reversing the district court’s grant of 
defendant’s motion for acquittal in a case in which the 
defendant was convicted of violating the American-Cuban 
embargo by conspiring to trade with Cuba). 
 
That deference is warranted because we trust jurors to 
judge the evidence, and we instruct them as to all aspects of 
their decision making.  Jurors are instructed extensively as to 
what evidence they can consider, how to consider it, and how 
to assess the credibility of witnesses, as well as the relevant 
legal principles.  We trust that they follow these instructions.  
See, e.g., United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 180 (3d 
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Cir. 2013) (“[T]he law presumes that jurors, conscious of the 
gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of 
the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to 
understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given 
them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Yet, in most of 
the cases discussed above, we have not trusted the jurors.  
Indeed, we have second-guessed them, acting not merely as 
the thirteenth juror, but as the decisive vote on the jury.  Too 
often, we failed to ask whether any reasonable juror could 
conclude that the defendant knew the transaction involved 
drugs; instead, we reassessed the evidence independently.  
Had we asked the appropriate question—“whether . . . any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”—we now believe 
the answer in most, if not all, of those cases would have been 
“yes.”  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). 
 
The confusion generated by the inconsistent results in 
our case law has worked to bedevil not only those adducing 
the evidence—the prosecution—but also those who are called 
upon to assess the evidence after the fact—namely, district 
court judges.  Thus, we take this opportunity to clarify the 
appropriate standard to apply in reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge in drug conspiracy cases.  The district 
court—and we—are not to act as a thirteenth juror.  Instead, 
the jury’s verdict must be assessed from the perspective of a 
reasonable juror, and the verdict must be upheld as long as it 
does not “fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”  
Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (“The jury 
in this case was convinced, and the only question under 
Jackson [v. Virginia] is whether that finding was so 
insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare 
rationality.”).   
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Furthermore, we take this opportunity to clarify that, 
although the prosecution must prove the defendant’s 
knowledge of the conspiracy’s specific objective, that  
knowledge need not be proven by direct evidence.  To the 
contrary, “[i]t is not unusual that the government will not 
have direct evidence.  Knowledge is often proven by 
circumstances.  A case can be built against the defendant 
grain-by-grain until the scale finally tips.”  Iafelice, 978 F.2d 
at 98.  Again, jurors are routinely instructed that their verdict 
can be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence, and 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from both types of 
evidence.   
 
With this in mind, we specifically disavow the 
reasoning we previously embraced—that the jury’s verdict 
could not stand when the evidence was as consistent with 
contraband other than controlled substances, even though a 
jury could rationally conclude that the defendant knew the 
subject of the conspiracy was drugs.  We specifically disavow 
our concern in Wexler, for instance, that “[t]he evidence is 
just as consistent, for example, with a conspiracy to transport 
stolen goods, an entirely different crime.”  838 F.2d at 92.  
While evidence proffered at trial may be consistent with 
multiple possibilities, our role as a reviewing court is to 
uphold the jury verdict—and not to usurp the role of the 
jury—as long as it passes the “bare rationality” test.  
Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply because another 
inference is possible—or even equally plausible—is 
inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of sufficiency 
of the evidence challenges, which is that “‘[t]he evidence 
does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save 
that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  
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United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(quoting United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir. 
1957)).  It is up to the jury—not the district court judge or our 
Court—to examine the evidence and draw inferences.  Unless 
the jury’s conclusion is irrational, it must be upheld.  In our 
role as reviewers, we must resist the urge to hypothetically 
insert ourselves into the jury room for deliberations.   
 
Of course, a finding as to a defendant’s knowledge is a 
fact-specific inquiry, and we cannot prescribe a specific 
formula as to what conduct or evidence is sufficient to infer 
knowledge.  Indeed, no one factor is dispositive, and the jury 
is carefully instructed as to how it must view the evidence in 
a given case.  As we stated in United States v. Cooper, “‘[t]he 
question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the 
defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a 
jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  567 F.2d at 
254 (quoting Allard, 240 F.2d at 841).  Nothing “additional” 
in the way of evidence as to knowledge is required. 
 
In reiterating this deferential standard, we are aligning 
ourselves with the majority of our sister circuits, from whom 
we had previously parted ways.  In Boria, we specifically 
noted in a footnote that most other courts of appeals do not 
“adhere to our strict approach to sufficiency in drug 
conspiracy cases.”  592 F.3d at 481 n.9.11  Our approach has 
                                              
11
 Indeed we contrasted the approaches of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits with that of the Second and 
District of Columbia Circuits.  See Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 n.9 
(comparing the approaches of different courts with respect to 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges in drug conspiracy 
cases).  But see Sliwo, 620 at 635 n.3 (citing Wexler in 
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been criticized, and as discussed above, this “strict approach” 
has taken us away from the application of the appropriate 
standard in sufficiency challenges.  See, e.g., Sliwo, 620 F.3d 
at 641 n.3 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“Application of Wexler in the 
Third Circuit has led to . . . peculiar results.  For example, it 
has led Third Circuit panels to undertake detailed, thirteenth 
juror-type analyses of the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, 
in spite of the deferential standard of review that ordinarily 
applies in such cases.”); see also Lipschutz, supra, at 510-13 
(discussing cases from other circuits, which “demonstrate that 
the Third Circuit is enigmatic in its willingness to overturn 
jury verdicts in conspiracy and aiding and abetting controlled 
substances cases based on sufficiency of evidence 
challenges”). 
C. 
Applying our newly reestablished standard to the case 
before us, we conclude that the jury’s verdict did not “fall 
below the threshold of bare rationality.”  Coleman, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2065.  It should therefore be reinstated.   
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, as we must, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that he was 
involved in an illegal venture.  Moreover, looking at the 
evidence that the jury considered, it is clear that it was not 
irrational for the jury to infer that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
knew—or was willfully blind to the fact—that the illegal 
venture involved transporting drugs.   
                                                                                                     
reversing a jury’s verdict and the district court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion for acquittal).   
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The evidence introduced at trial established that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez traveled from Puerto Rico to 
Philadelphia with a small overnight bag and only $33, for the 
sole purpose of taking two suitcases that he had not checked 
and did not belong to him off the baggage conveyor and 
putting those suitcases into a waiting vehicle.  From this, the 
jury could have easily concluded that he knew that was 
involved in an illegal venture.   
 
Furthermore, a rational jury could have inferred that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that the object of the venture was 
transporting drugs.  Deya-Diaz testified that he made 
arrangements with Domi to be paid $5,000 to pick up 
suitcases that he did not check.  Given that Deya-Diaz and 
Caraballo-Rodriguez had nearly identical phone records and 
took the same trip, a rational jury could have inferred that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez had the same arrangement.  From that, a 
rational jury could have inferred that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
knew that he was being paid such a sum to transport a 
controlled substance.  Cf. United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 
361, 366 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an inference of 
deliberate ignorance was warranted when the defendant was 
offered over $1,000 to deliver a $60 wood carving that 
contained cocaine). 
 
The evidence also suggested that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
was trusted to be alone with several million dollars worth of 
cocaine.  When Deya-Diaz and Cordero walked to the 
parking garage, they left Caraballo-Rodriguez at the baggage 
carousel to pick up the two suitcases by himself.  Based on 
that, the jury could have inferred that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
was not a “blind mule.”  As Agent Basewitz’s expert 
testimony suggested, although drug traffickers generally do 
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not explicitly tell couriers what they are carrying, they do not 
typically trust valuable cargo to an unknowing dupe.
12
   
 
Additionally, according to Deya-Diaz’s testimony, as 
soon as he picked up the suitcases and felt their significant 
weight, he surmised that they contained drugs.  A rational 
jury could have inferred the same knowledge on the part of 
Caraballo-Rodriguez.  Despite the fact that no DEA agent 
saw Caraballo-Rodriguez specifically put the suitcases into 
the Suburban, it would be rational for the jury to infer that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez also experienced the weight of the 
suitcases since he was responsible for taking the suitcases 
from the baggage conveyor to the car.  The District Court 
noted that Deya-Diaz had a history of transporting cash, and 
because he had previously felt the weight of suitcases full of 
cash, he knew that the heavier suitcases in this case did not 
contain cash, and therefore “common sense” told him they 
contained drugs.  Although there was no evidence that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez had served as a courier before, it was 
not unreasonable for the jury to find that Caraballo-Rodriguez 
would have believed that the suitcases contained drugs once 
he picked them up.  Indeed, given the totality of the evidence 
and surrounding suspicious circumstances, a rational jury 
could have inferred that “common sense” would suggest to 
anyone that two suitcases, each weighing at least 12 
kilograms, contained drugs and not currency.   
The jury certainly could have drawn other inferences.  
But that is not the issue.  Rather, looking at “the evidence as a 
                                              
12
 The jury heard Agent Basewitz’s testimony, to which 
Caraballo-Rodriguez did not object.  This testimony was 
admitted and therefore must be considered as part of the 
entire record.  Boria, 592 F.3d at 480.   
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whole, not in isolation,” there is enough evidence to support 
the jury’s inference of knowledge.  Boria, 592 F.3d at 480.  
The combination of Caraballo-Rodriguez’s travel plans, 
Deya-Diaz’s testimony, the phone records, Agent Basewitz’s 
expert testimony, and the jury’s own common sense 
accumulated “grain-by-grain” until the jury could rationally 
decide that “the scale finally tip[ped].”  Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 
98.  This quantum of evidence provided a sufficient 
foundation for the jury to rationally conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that the 
object of the conspiracy was a controlled substance.  
Although perhaps none of that evidence standing alone could 
have supported the jury’s inference of knowledge, looking at 
the record as a whole, the jury’s conclusion was not irrational.  
As discussed above, it is not the business of a reviewing court 
to play the role of an extra juror in assessing all the possible 
inferences that could be drawn.   
 
Moreover, the jury received a willful blindness 
instruction, which permitted it to infer knowledge if the 
evidence showed that “the defendant . . . was subjectively 
aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not 
merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of the 
probability.”  Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365.  Given the evidence 
discussed above, the jury certainly could have reasonably 
inferred that Caraballo-Rodriguez was aware of the “high 
probability” that he was transporting a controlled substance. 
 
IV. 
 Our opinions with respect to sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges in drug conspiracy cases have not always 
provided the government, defendants, or judges with clear 
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guidelines.  Many cases have reached seemingly inconsistent 
results, because we have appeared to act as the jury in 
deciding which inference was the most plausible, rather than 
asking the proper question, that is, whether the jury’s 
inference was merely rational.  We take this opportunity to 
reiterate the appropriate standard for reviewing sufficiency of 
the evidence claims, as discussed above. 
 
Under that proper standard, the jury’s conclusion that 
Caraballo-Rodriguez knew that he was involved in a drug 
conspiracy was rational.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court’s judgment of acquittal and remand with 
directions that the District Court reinstate the jury’s verdict of 
conviction and proceed to sentencing. 
